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RICE v. PALADIN: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S
UNNECESSARY LIMITING OF A PUBllSHER'S FREEDOM
OF SPEECH
1.

INTRODUCTION

On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold entered Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado and killed twelve fellow
students and a teacher; wounded several others; then turned their
guns on themselves, committing suicide. 1 These two had an arsenal
of weapons, including at least one hundred homemade bombs,2 seventy-six of which they planted in the high schooP Thirty of the seventy-six bombs detonated. 4
Harris and Klebold obtained instructions to make many of
these explosives from the Internet. s One of the perpetrators, Eric
Harris, published pipe-bomb assembly instructions on his personal
Web page, which also featured links to other, similar websites. 6
Publications providing instructions on how to perform criminal
acts have been available to Americans for many years. 7 A 1997 Department of Justice (DOJ) report revealed that publications providing bomlrmaking instructions are "readily available to any member
of the public interested in reading them and copying their con1. See Angie Cannon et aI., Why?, u.s. NEWS & WORLD REpORT, May 3, 1999, at 1617.
2. See id.
3. See Gary Massaro et aI., Report Sheds Light on Tragedy Swat Team Found Saunders
Alive, But Paramedics Arrived Too Late, DENVER RocKY MTN. NEWS, May 15, 2000,
at 4A. The teenagers left the remaining thirteen bombs in their cars parked
outside of the school. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Kevin McCoy, Internet Targeted in Probe, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22, 1999, at
34.
6. See id. "Harris ... apparently bragged about the ease of building pipe bombs
in a file on his America Online Web site .... " Id. "The site included instructions on attaching shrapnel to a bomb, as well as the type and amount of explosive powder needed." Id.
7. See also REx FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (Paladin Press) (1983) (killing for hire); J. FLORES, How TO MAKE A DISPOSABLE SILENCER, (VOL. II): A COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE (Paladin Press)
(1983) (crafting a disposable silencer); WILLlAM L. PIERCE, THE TURNER DIARIES
(Barricade Books) (1978) (creating a bomb).
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tents."8 With a few strokes on a computer keyboard, one can have
such a publication almost instantaneously.9 In the 1997 report, the
001 stated:
It is readily apparent from our cursory examination that anyone interested in manufacturing a bomb, dangerous
weapon or weapon of mass destruction can easily obtain de8. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REpORT ON THE AVAIlABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROLLED BY FEDERAL LAw,
AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAy BE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, April, 1997, at 5, available at <http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/
speech/bomb.html#pubavail> [hereinafter BOMB MAKING]. A member of the
DOJ Committee found titles to over 110 different bomb-making texts listed on
a website, such as "How To MAKE A C02 BOMB," "JUG BOMB," "CHERRY
BOMB," "MAIL GRENADE," "CALCIUM CARBIDE BOMB," and "CHEMICAL FIRE BOTTLE." These titles could be readily printed or copied. See id. at 7. See also, Gerald Mizejewski, 21 Pipe Bombs Found in Boy Toy Box Detonation Prompted Search
of Apartment, Sept. 6, 2000 WASH. TIMES (D.C.) at Cl, available at 2000 WL
4164186 (quoting A.T.F. Agent Mike Campbell: "With the advent of the Internet and published books [about bombs], the instructions are readily available . . . [and] not difficult devices.to construct and make work"); Amitai Etzioni, Is Information on How to Make a Bomb More Harmful than Porn?, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 1995 at 31 (discussing numerous how-to crime books available by mail order including: BE YOUR OWN UNDERTAKER: How TO DISPOSE OF A
DEAD BODY, DEADLY BREW: ADVANCED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVES, THE ANCIENT ART
OF STRANGULATION, THE POOR MAN's SNIPER RiFLE, 21 TECHNIQUES OF SILENT
KiLLING, THE HOME AND RECREATIONAL USE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES, KiLL WITHOUT
JOY: THE COMPLETE HOW-To-KiLL BooK, GUERRILLA'S ARSENAL: ADVANCED TECHNIQUES FOR MAKING EXPLOSIVES AND TIME-DELAY BOMBS, ULTIMATE SNIPER, THE
BIG BOOK OF MISCHIEF, SILENT BUT DEADLY: MORE HOMEMADE SILENCERS FROM
HAYDUKE THE MAsTER, How TO BUILD PRACTICAL FIREARM SUPPRESSORS: AN ILLUSTRATED STEP-By-STEP GUIDE, and THE TERRORIST HANDBOOK); WILLIAM L.
PIERCE, THE TURNER DIARIES (Barricade Books 1978). The Turner Diaries, written
by the leader of the National Alliance, a white supremacist group in West Virginia, and another "how to" book published by Paladin was found in Timothy
McVeigh's possession when he was arrested for the April 19, 1995 bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. See
Doreen Carvajal, Group Tries to Halt Selling of Racist Nove~ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
1996, § 1, at 8.
9. See Carvajal, supra note 8, § 1, at 8; see also http://www.totse.com/files/FA031/
draino.htm (visited Sept. 26, 2000) (draino bomb); http://www.totse.com/
files/FA031/pipebomb.htm (visited Sept. 26, 2000) (pipe bomb); http://members.aol.com/ eukaryote/SciHumor /bomb.html (visited Sept. 26, 2000)
(atomic bomb); see Cheryl White, My Son Built a Bomb, LADIES HOME]', Mar. 1,
1997, at 36 (discussing a son's injuries resulting from attempting to detonate a
bomb built from information obtained from the Internet).
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tailed instructions for fabricating and using such a device.
Available sources include not only publications from the socalled underground press but also manuals written for legitimate purposes, such as military, agricultural, industrial and
engineering purposes. Such information is also readily available to anyone with access to a home computer equipped
with a modem. 10
There is little doubt that, had Harris and Klebold not taken
their own lives, they would, at a minimum, have been incarcerated
for life; however, some believe that the publishers of these how-to
materials are partially responsible for the teenagers' actions.u
Would this tragedy been avoided had these instructions not been
available? .
The events at Columbine High School provoke consideration
of whether, by publishing information on how to commit a crime,
the publisher becomes criminally responsible for assisting a reader
who uses that information to commit a crime. However, to impose
criminal responsibility without proper consideration to the protections afforded by the United States Constitution eviscerates both the
protections necessary to maintain a free society, and the personal
responsibility of the actual offenders. Some believe this information
is not protected by the First Amendment because publishers are assisting in criminal conduct. 12 Others believe such a publication IS
10. Id. at 9.
11. Lonn Weissblum, Comment, Incitement to Violence on the World Wide Web: Can
Publishers Seek First Amendment Refuge?, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 35,
57-58 (2000).
12. See STANLEY FISH. THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GoOD
THING. Too 102 (1994) ("Nowadays the First Amendment is the First Refuge
of Scoundrels" (quoting S. Johnson & S. Fish»; S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy
& Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARy L. REv. 1159. 1168 (2000) ("The contemporary First Amendment speech categories do not address adequately the social
costs associated with speech intended to facilitate antisocial behavior."); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 7
(1986) ("[TJhe suggestion that the first amendment ties our hands in dealing
with ... revolutionaries ... is an unintended intimation of that most frightening of constitutional conceptions: the Constitution as a suicide pact."). Accord Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 449, 449-52 (1985) (arguing that context is an important element of contemporary First Amendment analysis); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE LJ.
1411, 1424, 1438 (1995) (positing that consideration of context is essential to
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protected by the First Amendment and should be scrutinized to determine whether there is a direct government interest advanced in
suppressing the publication, and whether that interest is legitimate,
substantial, or compelling enough to justify its suppression. 13
The First Amendment of the Constitution affords United States
residents the rights to speak and print free of government prohibition. 14 Although the right to free speech in the United States is wellestablished, this freedom risks encroachment based on the notion
that harmful ideas and words result in harmful acts. 15
In the landmark case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,16 the Supreme
Court developed a test to separate political speech and abstract advocacy, both protected by the First Amendment, from speech advocating illegal conduct, which is unprotected by the First Amendment. 17 Many cases' involving media publications that reportedly
incite illegal and harmful acts have been scrutinized under the
Brandenburg doctrine. 1s Although this test does not always provide
defendants with the most desirable outcome, the application of the
test, alone, signifies the First Amendment protection and recognition of publication as a form of speech.
In recent years, most courts have ruled that "how-to" publications, similar to the bomb-making materials Harris and Klebold accessed, are not entitled to First Amendment scrutiny, failing to recognize them as a protected form of speech. 19 Most of these cases

13.
14.

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

proper application of the First Amendment properly); see also DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, BOMB MAKING 26 (1997) available at <http://www.usdog.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.htmi> ("[W]here it is foreseeable that the publication will be used for criminal purposes . . . the Brandenburg requirement
that the facilitated crime be imminent should be of little, if any, relevance.").
Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Protection of Commercial Speech Under First Amendment-Suprtmze Court Cases, 164 AL.R FED. 1, § 14-16 (2000).
See infra note 26 and accompanying text for the language of the First Amendment.
See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1322
(1992) (" [E]xisting understandings of the First Amendment presuppose that
legal toleration of speech-related harm is the currency with which we as a society pay for First Amendment protection."); see also infra Pan V.
395 U.S. 444.
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; infra Part II.E for a thorough discussion of
Brandenburg v. Ohio.
See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text, Part III.
Compare Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
First Amendment does not apply to book providing explicit instructions to
commit murder); National Org. for Women V. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646,
656 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("That 'aiding and abetting' of an illegal act may be car-
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preclude using the First Amendment as a defense to those who provide instructions on how to accomplish a crime, holding that, although information relaying illegal instructions is a form of speech,
it is not protected by the First Amendment because it assists in committing a crime. 20
Recently, in Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc. 21 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment
posed no bar to imposing civil liability against the publisher, after
the defendant, James Perry, was contracted to murder three individuals after reading murder for hire. how-to books. 22 The court refused to recognize the content of the books as a protected form of
speech, afforded the publisher no First Amendment protection, and
found that the publisher may be civilly liable for aiding and abetting the murders by publishing the books.23

20.

21.

22.

23.

ried out through speech is no bar to its illegality."); United States v. Rowlee,
899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding no First Amendment issue for defendarIt
instructor who sold tax forms to justify fraudulent claims and provided tax advice for all of the members on how to evade taxes); United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 1990) (precluding First Amendment defense where speech in computer software instructions is closely intertwined
with a criminal act); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982)
(convicting defendarIt for aiding and abetting individuals in manufacture of
phencyclidine (PCP) after defendant provided instructions in High Times magazine); United States v. VararIi, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) ("[S]peech is
not protected by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime
itself.") with Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987)
(ruling for defendarIt after applying the Brandenburg test where young boy followed instructions for auto-erotic asphyxia and consequently suffocated despite publisher's explicit and numerous warnings).
See Rice, 128 F.3d at 248 ("[T]he First Amendment poses no bar to the imposition of civil (or criminal) liability for speech acts which the plaintiff (or the
prosecution) can establish were undertaken with specific, if not criminal, intent.") (citations omitted); Rowiee, 899 F.2d at 1278, 1280 ("Having undertaken to charge on the First Amendment, the district court correctly instructed the jury that, if the defendants [conspired to defraud the IRS]
the First Amendment afforded no defense.").
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 242. The books were HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (Paladin Press) (1983) (hereinafter "HIT MAN") and How
TO MAKE A DISPOSABLE SILENCER, (VOL. II): A COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE
(hereinafter "DISPOSABLE SILENCER"). See id. at 238 (HIT MAN), 241 (DISPOSABLE
SILENCER).
See id. at 267. The Fourth Circuit's holding Was reinforced when the Supreme
Court denied certiorari to hear the case. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 523
U.S. 1074 (1998). See also infra Part IV for a complete discussion of Rice v.
Paladin Enters., Inc.
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Although the outcome may have be the same, the Brandenburg
doctrine should have been applied to the Rice case. 24 By refusing to
provide the publisher of Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent
Contractors with First Amendment protection, publishers must now
be concerned with the possible effect and liability of the content of
texts submitted for publication. 25
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. "26 This right is firmly entrenched into our system of government. 27 Some consider it the
most valuable freedom, as Justice Holmes illustrated:
[W] hen men have realized that time has upset many a
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
24. See infra Part II.E, IV & V exploring the Brandenburg doctrine, its rationale,
application and purpose; the speech act doctrine, its rationale for this First
Amendment exception; and why the doctrine should be applied to cases such
as Rice.
25. See infra Part V discussing Rice v. Paladin and its implications for the future.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. Since the early days of the American Revolution, individual parties and the
courts have shaped First Amendment legal analysis. For example, Thomas
"Jefferson once remarked that he did not care whether his neighbor said that
there are twenty gods or no God, because 'it neither picks my pocket nor
breaks my leg.'" Leonard Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800, 68
AM. HIST. REv. 22, 22 (1962). Likewise;
In 1789 William Cushing, the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, wrote a
long letter to John Adams discussing the press clause in the Massachusetts Constitution. Cushing asserted the importance of a free
press to good government and stressed the crucial role the American
press played in resisting British authority and supporting the Revolution. He claimed that the clause covered subsequent as well as previous restraints, and . .. advocated truth as a defense against prosecutions for seditious libel. Adams, who had drafted this clause,
essentially agreed with Cushing.
David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 795, 812 (1985).
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market, and the truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes can safely be carried out.28
This "market place of ideas" philosophy is founded upon the notions that all ideas are worth advocating in the market place of free
speech, and that faith in the idea is truly tested within this market
place. 29
The boundaries of this marketplace continue to be defined
through judicial determinations. 30 Such boundaries occurred with
the Supreme Court's recognition of the government's interest in
protecting people. The Court established five categories of speech
that are not afforded First Amendment protection, namely: (1) obscenity,31 (2) fighting words,32 (3) libel,33 (4) commercial speech,34
and (5) words likely to incite imminent lawless action. 35
A.

Obscenity

The Supreme Court excluded the first category of unprotected
speech, obscenity, in Miller v. California. 36 In Miller, the defendant
was criminally charged under California law for conducting a mass
28. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, j., dissenting).
29. See Edward j. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the "Clear and Present Danger"
Theory of the First Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1118, 113944 (1990); Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Mametplace of Ideas, 19 u.c. DAVIS L. REv. 669,
669-72 (1986).
30. Compare Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996) with Rice
v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
31. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
32. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
33. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
34. See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
35. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969). This Comment focuses on the fifth category-words that incite imminent lawless action, also
known as the speech act. However, to appreciate this exception it is important
to understand the first four unprotected areas of speech.
36. 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (reaffirming Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 48485 (1957»; see also Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771-77 (1977) (finding an Illinois statute conforms with the test set fourth for obscenity and affirming
defendant's conviction for selling sadomasochistic publications); Pendleton v.
California, 423 U.S. 1068, 1068 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (urging the
Court to analyze the allegedly obscene material under the second and third
prongs of Miller before convicting the defendant); J-R Distribs., Inc. v. Washington, 418 U.S. 949, 949-53 (1974) (striking back at Justice Brennan's thirteen dissents to the Supreme Court's decisions to deny certiorari and balancing the right of consenting adults to obtain obscenity with the right of the
states to prohibit the distribution of obscenity).
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mailing of unsolicited brochures advertising adult books around the
state. 37 These brochures depicted men and women engaged in sexually explicit activities. 38 Two individuals, offended by the brochures,
brought the mailing to the police. 39 The appellant, Marvin Miller,
argued that the California statute under which he was charged was
overbroad and encroached on his freedom of expression. 4O
The Court struck a balance between the appellant'S freedom of
expression and the State's interest in protecting its residents from
offensive, unsolicited materials 41 by creating parameters within
which members of the community were to determine whether the
brochure was obscene. 42 The Court enumerated the following
guidelines:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, ... (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 43
If the material under consideration met these criteria, then it was
obscene and lacked First Amendment protection. 44 The policy behind this exception to free speech was to protect children and unconsenting adults from exposure to vulgar material. 45

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

44.
45.

See id. at 16, 18.
See id. at 18.
See id.
See id. at 25.
Compare id. at 23-24 (discussing appellant's right to free expression) with id. at
18-19 (discussing the state's interests in regulating obscene material).
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Court remanded the case to be determined,
consistent with the standard enumerated in its opinion. See id. at 37.
[d. at 24. For additional commentary about the Supreme Court's definition of
obscenity and of community standards, see, e.g., Joseph T. Clark, The "Community Standard" in the Trial of Obscenity Cases-A Mandate for Empirical Evidence in
Search of the Truth, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 13, 14-16 (1993); Anne Salzman, On
the Offensive: Protecting Visual Art With Sexual Content Under the First Amendment
and the "Less Valuable Speech" Label 55 U. PUT. L. REv. 1215, 122943 (1994);
Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the Classroom: Teaching the Limits of the First
Amendment 66 TENN. L. REv. 597, 615-36 (1999).
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
[d. at 27.
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Fighting Words

The second category of unprotected speech, "fighting words,"
was created in Chaplisky v. New Hampshire. 46 The Supreme Court defined fighting words as "those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. "47 This
seminal case arose after a Jehovah's Witness standing near the entrance to a city hall building in Rochester, New York yelled: " '[y] ou
are a God damned rackateer' and 'a damned facist and the whole
government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists'" to an
unnamed religious individual. 48
The Court held that those words were not protected by the
First Amendment given their propensity to incite others to react vialently.49 Elaborating, the Court explained that the effect of the
words was not based on what the hearer thinks, but what "men of
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight . . . . "50 Because the appellant
breached the peace and shouted fighting words, the First Amendment did not protect his speech, and the Court upheld his
conviction. 51

46. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Court justified restraining orders for picketers
outside abortion clinics because the picketer'S speech constituted fighting
words. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357,
374-85 (1997); Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S.
1133, 1135-39 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the
Workplace: Harassment or Protected SPeech? 22 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 959 (1999)
(relating religious speech to speech that incites people to become enraged,
and balancing religious speech as fighting words with the right to freedom of
religion); J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
2295 (1999) (discussing the similarities between sexual harassment and fighting words).
48. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 573.
51. See id. at 574. In affirming the conviction, the Court stated:
Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the
privilege of free speech. Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate
that the appellations "damned racketeer" and "damned facist" are
epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace.
Id.

,
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Libel

Libel, a publication made with actual malice52 that is "injurious
to the reputation of another, "53 is the third category of unprotected
speech. 54 In New York Times v. Sullivan,55 the respondent, L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, sued the
New York Times for printing libelous statements about him in a fullpage advertisement. 56 Although never identified by name, Sullivan
alleged that any reader would know he was being mocked in the advertisement given its contents and his position in the community.57
The New York Times sought refuge in the security of the First
Amendment. 58 Addressing this argument, the Court stated: "libel
can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured with standards that satisfy the First Amendment. "59 Considering the case in this light, the Court found that the
nature of the advertisement-an "expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time"60-"would seem
to clearly qualify for the constitutional protection. "61 First Amendment protection did not depend on whether the statements made
were true,62 nor defamatory;63 however, those statements made with
actual malice-"knowledge that [the statements were] false or with
reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or not"64-were not
protected. 65 The Court found that although negligent, the newspaper did not act with actual malice; therefore, publication of the advertisement was protected. 66
52. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
53. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 915 (6th ed. 1990).
54. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For an overview and recent analysis of libel, see Robert D. Sack, Protection of opinion Under the First
Amendment: Reflections on Alfred Hill, "Defamation and Privacy Under the First
Amendment," 100 COLUM. L. REv. 294 (2000).
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. See id. at 256.
57. See id. at 258.
58. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 271.
63. See id. at 273.
64. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
65. See id.
66. See id; see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1,21-23 (1990) ("[WJhere
a statement of 'opinion' on a matter of public concern reasonably implies
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Commercial Speech

The fourth category, commercial speech, speech that advertises
a business purpose,67 is afforded limited protection by the First
Amendment because it is coercive and holds a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values .... "68 As such, the Supreme Court determined that the level of judicial scrutiny was lower
in order to protect the public from it. 69 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass 'n,70 the Supreme Court discussed the interplay between free

67.
68.

69.

70.

false and defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials, those individuals must show that such statements were made with knowledge of their false
implications or with reckless disregard of their truth."); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1989) (explaining that
where a public figure brings suit, the public figure must show actual malice
under the New York Times standard for libel); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 48-57 (1988) (holding that a nationally known minister could not win
a suit for libel against a magazine that parodied the minister without showing
actual malice on the part of the magazine); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 34546 (1974) (determining actual malice includes consideration of the status of
the individual being defamed as a public or private figure, resulting in imposition of liability on a newspaper publisher who printed false information that
private individual was a communist); Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.,
485 A.2d 374, 387 (Pa. 1984) (establishing the burden on the appellant to
prove the truth of defamatory statements does not violate the First Amendment). The New York Times' victory is also attributed to the overbreadth doctrine under which the Court declared the Alabama statute at issue in the. case
unconstitutional. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 291-92.
BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 271 (6th ed. 1990).
See Ohralik v. Ohio, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978) ("Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act
upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands
an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or
reflection."). For a more complete discussion regarding commercial speech,
see Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771 (1999).
See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457; see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v.
United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1930-36 (1999) (determining whether a Federal
Communications Commission regulation advances a government interest and
can preclude certain commercial speech); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 468-504 (discussing "whether being compelled to fund
this advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or rather is
simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve" and holding that the advertising program does not violate the First
Amendment); Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-35 (1995) (distinguishing between free speech and commercial speech, and holding that attorney advertising is not afforded unlimited freedom of speech).
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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speech and the ability of the States to regulate commercial activity.71
Ohralik originated after an attorney made repeated, in-person solicitations, attempting to represent two women injured in an automobile accident.72 The appeal resulted from a state bar association determination that the attorney violated the rules of professional
conduct, and subsequent discipline. 73 The attorney claimed that his
activity was protected under the First Amendment. 74 Rejecting this
argument, the Court held that the attorney's in-person solicitation
was unprotected commercial speech that could be regulated by the
State. 75 In its rationale, the Court stressed the need for a prophylactic regulation that would protect the public from unscrupulous professional conduct and distinguished a public advertisement from inperson solicitation. 76 The former, which is not coercive and leaves
time for the recipient to act on his or her own, was protected
under the First Amendment. 77 However, because the latter exerted
pressure on an individual to make a decision without the proper information and an opportunity to weigh the circumstances, it was
not protected. 78
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.

77.
78.

See id. at 455-56.
See id. at 449-51.
See id. at 454.
See id. The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 361 (1927); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400
(1923).
See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454.
See id. at 457, 468. Direct, in-person solicitation is also prohibited by the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in the Maryland Rules of Civil
Procedure. See MD. RULE 16-812 (2000) (Incorporating Rule 7.3 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, which permits direct contact with prospective clients only when the prospective client: (1) is a close friend, relative,
etc.; (2) under the auspice of a bona fide charitable legal organization; or (3)
under the auspice of a bona fide political or similar organization whose mission includes recommending legal services related to the purpose of the organization); see also American Bar Ass'n, ANN. MOD. RULES PROF. COND., Rule
7.3 (1999) (prohibiting direct solicitation of prospective clients).
See id. at 457.
See id. The Court looked at "the immediacy of [the] particular communication and the imminence of harm [as] factors that made certain communications less protected than others.» [d. at 457 n.13. (comparing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (laying the foundation for
speech acts); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (finding the
defendant guilty of violating the Espionage Act when he mailed leaflets to
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In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,79 addressed commercial speech
protection again, enumerating a four-part test. so In Central Hudson,
the New York Public Service Commission, the regulatory arm of government for utilities in New York, classified advertising as either
promotional or informative, then banned promotional advertising. 81
The plaintiffs brought suit alleging the regulation was unconstitutional because it violated their choice to advertise freely under the
First Amendment. 82 However, the Court categorized the speech as
commercial, which is not afforded absolute protection. 83
The Court found that to regulate commercial speech, the government must "assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech."84 In addition, the government must
demonstrate that the regulation was directly related to its purpose,
and the regulation must be drawn narrowly.85 To achieve these
objectives, the Court enumerated a four-part test for commercial
speech. 86
.
First, the Court asked how valuable the need to advertise was to
the company.87 In Central Hudson, the corporation monopolized the
market; therefore, although advertising was always important, this
factor weighed low in the analysis. 88 Second, the Court looked at
the state's interest. 89 Here, it concluded energy conservation was always important and was a valid state interest. 90 Third, the Court focused "on the relationship between the State's interests and the advertising ban. "91 The Court concluded this prong was weak because

men, telling them to dodge the draft».
79. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
80. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1930
(1999), discusses the four parts of the Central Hudson test. It explains that the
four parts are interrelated and "not entirely discrete." Id.
81. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-59.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 561.
84. Id. at 564.
85. See id. at 564-65. The Court is clear that the interest cannot be indirect; it
must be a direct government interest. See id.
86. See id. at 566-71.
87. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-68.
88. See id. at 567-68.
89. See id. at 568-69.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 569.
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the link was speculative. 92 The final prong was "whether the Commission's complete suppression of speech ordinarily protected by
the First Amendment is no mor:e extensive than necessary to further
the State's interest in energy conservation."93 Here, the Commission's regulation failed because, although the State had an important interest, it was not sufficient to justify suppressing all
advertising. 94
These cases are the cornerstone for First Amendment analysis
of commercial speech. Orahlik redefined the interplay between protected speech and regulated, unprotected speech. 95 Central Hudson
provided the framework to analyze commercial speech.96

E.

Words Likely to Incite Imminent Lawless Action
The cases guiding the protection of the First Amendment:
[H] ave fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action. 97

There is a fine line between mere advocacy protected by the First
Amendment, and advocacy directed at inciting imminent lawless action, which is devoid of First Amendment protection. In order to
understand the current standard for distinguishing between the two
types of advocacy, it is important to understand the seminal case of
this area of speech, Brandenburg v. Ohio. 98
In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court declared Ohio's Criminal
Syndicalism Act unconstitutiona1. 99 This statute punished people
who advocated violent political and industrial reform. 1Oo In that
92. See id.
93. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-70.
94. [d.

95. See supra notes 7~78 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the test enumerated in Central Hudson.
97. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
98. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
99. See id. at 448.
100. See id. The Act punishes persons who "advocate or teach the duty, necessity,
or propriety" of violence "as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform;" or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper containing
such advocacy; or who "justify" the commission of violent acts "with intent to
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case, a newspaper journalist filmed two meetings of the Klu Klux
Klan (KKK), during which the appellant stated that continued "suppression" of the Caucasian race would lead the Klan to commit acts
of "revengeance" against the President, Congress, and the Supreme
Court. 101 Both films revealed KKK members yelling noxious statements about people of Jewish and African-American heritage, stating that the KKK should deport Jews to Israel and the AfricanAmericans to Africa. 102 These films were used by the State to convict
the appellant of violating Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act. 103
The Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment. 104 In its analysis, the Court revisited
Whitney v. California,105 where it upheld a California statute similar to
the Ohio Act because "'advocating' violent means to effect political
and economic change involves such danger to the security of the
State that the State may outlaw it. "106 However, in Brandenburg, the
Court articulated a new principle that "constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action. "107 The Court stressed, "the mere
abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity
for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a
group for violent action and steeling it to such action. "108 Significantly, the Court distinguished the right to assemble and teach
from the unprotected act of causing imminent danger to the safety

101.
102.
103.
104.

105.
106.
107.

108.

exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism;" or who "voluntarily assemble" with a group formed "to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id.
See id. at 446.
See id. at 44647.
See id. at 445.
See id. at 448. The Court stated:
Accordingly, we are confronted with a statute which, by its own words
and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on
pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
[d. at 449.
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
[d. (emphasis added). The Court indicated that this principle was the result of
a past decision that had discredited Whitney. See id. (citing Dennis v. U.S. 341
U.S. 494, 507 (1951». The Brandenburg Court overruled Whitnry. See id. at 449.
[d. at 448. (quoting Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961».
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of citizens. 109 Any statute that did not distinguish advocacy from incitement of imminent lawless action intruded upon First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms.lIO
Applying the law to the facts before it, the Court held the Ohio
statute unconstitutional because it punished mere advocacy.111 The
appellant advocated what he believed to be the importance of lawless action, which the statute forbade. ll2 The First Amendment protected the appellant's speech because he advocated his. belief of the
importance of acts of "revenge" and the deportation of Jews and Mrican-Americans.ll3 However, the Court's rationale indicated that,
had the appellant made a speech that was directed to incite acts of
"revenge" and the deportation of Jews and Mrican-Americans, and
the effect of his speech would have made the occurrence of such acts
likely, then his speech would not have been protected by the First
Amendment.1I4
v
The Brandenburg two-prong test, whereby speech, first, "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action [, and second, that it is] . . . likely to incite or produce such action,"115
promulgated a clear test to determine the line between protected
and unprotected "dangerous" speech under the First Amendme~t.116 The test distinguished speech that incites imminent lawless
action, which was unprotected, from mere advocacy, which retained
the protection of the First Amendment.ll7
Following Brandenburg, various courts have assessed what information must be provided in order for advocacy to be protected as
free speech. liS The Supreme Court applied the Brandenburg test in
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.11 9 In Claiborne, the NAACP boycotted ~everal white merchants who disregarded the NAACP's de109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 448-49.
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
See id. at 449.
See id. at 448.
See id.
See id. at 447, 449.
See id. at 447.
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
See id.; see also supra notes 107'{)8 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
458 U.S. 886 (1982). But see O. Lee Reed, The State is Strong but I am Weak: Why
the "Imminent Lawl£ss Action" Standard Should Not Apply to Speech that Threatens
Individuals with Vioi£nce, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 177, 199-203 (2000). "At best the doctrinal connection between Claibourne and Brandenburg is tenuous and unfortunate." See id. at 200.
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mands for racial equality and integration. l20 Charles Evers, a NAACP
official and boycott organizer, in a public speech, said that blacks
would be watched and anyone who did not act in accordance with
the boycott "would be answerable to him."121 In another speech, Evers said that "boycott violators would be disciplined by their own
people,"122 and in a third speech said, "[i]f we catch any of you going into any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn
neck. "123
The Court found that Evers speech passed the Brandenburg test,
and was therefore protected. 124 Justice Stevens wrote that, "[i]n the
passionate atmosphere in which the speeches were delivered, they
might have been understood as inviting an unlawful form of discipline or, at least, as intending to create a fear of violence whether
or not improper discipline was specifically intended. "125 Evers address was basically "an impassioned plea" for blacks to unify and
support each other and to ."realize the political and economic
power available to them. "126 The Court acknowledged that Evers
used strong language, and added that a question of Evers' liability
would have been raised if his speech had been followed by acts of
violence. 127
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY IMPOSED FOR SPEECH INSTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF PENAL LAWS
Unlike in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., several courts have
imposed criminal liability for speech-related conduct.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Claiboume, 458 U.S. at 889.
See id. at 900 n.28, 926.
See id. at 902.
See id.
See id. at 928.
See id. at 927.
See Claibourne, 458 U.S. at 928. "An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous appeals for unity and action in a common cause."
See id.
127. See id. The Court added that with the exception of one incident, acts of violence happened within weeks or months of one of Evers' speeches. See id. The
Court also pointed out: "If there were other evidence of his authorization of
wrongful conduct, the references to discipline in the speeches could be used
to corroborate that evidence." Id. at 929; see also Reed, supra note 119, at 202
("The opinion emphasized the necessary evidentiary connection between incitement and violence within a reasonable time .... ").
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Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists

A.

In Planned Parenthood oj Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition oj Life Activists,l28 the plaintiffs ("Providers") sued members of
the anti-abortion group, American Coalition of Life Activists
("ACLA"), alleging ACLA issued material comprising threats to
their safety.129 The appellate court enjoined the defendant from
publishing and exhibiting materials, including a poster entitled
"The Deadly Dozen," which listed the names and addresses of doctors who performed abortions and was exhibited at anti-abortion
rallies. l30 The appellate court found that the speech act of publishing and exhibiting this poster at abortion rallies created a true
threat to bodily harm of the plaintiffs. l31 In addition, the ACLA had
various "WANTED" posters and papers collectively referred to as
the "Nuremburg File," which contained names and addresses of
doctors who performed abortions.132 The Nuremburg File was also
posted on the Internet. 133
On March 10, 1993, Dr. David Gunn was shot and killed
outside the Pensacola, Florida office where he performed abortion
procedures. l34 On August 21, 1993, Dr. George Patterson was also
shot and killed outside the clinic where he performed abortions.135
Prior to their murders, the names and addresses of both Drs. Gunn
and Patterson were listed on an ACLA "WANTED" poster. 136 On
July 29, 1994, Dr. John Byard Britton, the doctor who replaced Dr.
Gunn, was shot and killed outside his office, along with his escort.137
Mter extensive findings of fact, the court briefly addressed the
defendant's contention that the posters and the Nuremburg Files
were protected speech, "totally reject[ing]" this defenseps Relying
128. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999), vacated by 2001 WL 293260 (9th Cir. March
28,2001).
129. See id. at 1133. The plaintiffs were seeking injunctive relief against and damages from ACtA, as well as other relief. See id.
130. See id. at 1134.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1133-34.
133. See Planned Parenthood, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1135.
138. See id. at 1154-55.
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on the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE"),139 the
court held that the defendant's freedom of speech was fallible. 140
FACE expressly gave courts the authority to provide injunctive relief
when a plaintiff faced unlawful threats. 141 Given these threats, the
court held that each day the above-mentioned material was open
for public consumption, the plaintiffs' were in physical danger. 142
While the court acknowledged that a heightened scrutiny was applicable because potentially protected speech was involved, it held that
this heightened scrutiny was clearly satisfied and that the publication of such sensitive information was not protected speech.143
B.

United States v. Rowlee

In United States v. Rowlee,144 the defendants were convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and aiding and assisting others in the filing of false tax documents. 145 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
First Amendment protection did not extend to participation in a
conspiracy to defraud the IRS, and that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the First Amendment afforded no defense
where the defendants urged preparation and presentation of fraudulent documents, when they knew their advice would be heeded. 146
In 1990, the defendant formed the New York Patriot Society for
Individual Liberty and Association (the "Society"), and worked as
the Executive Director. 147 The Society dealt exclusively with promoting tax evasion, and advertised its services in the newspaper. 148
Based on these advertisements, Mr. Rowlee formed classes where he
instructed members on how to unlawfully evade the Internal Revenue Code. 149 After completing his course, the defendant sold packets to students who had elected to become members of his club
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
See Planned Parenthood, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1155.
899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 828 (1990) (finding no First
Amendment protection for defendant instructor who sold tax forms to justify
fraudulent claims and provided tax advice for all of the members on how to
evade taxes).
See id. at 1276.
See id. at 1276-77.
See id.
See id. at 1276.
See Rowlee, 899 F.2d at 1277.
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that contained W-4 forms and instructions to complete the form
and evade taxes. 150 Additionally, the defendant acted as a tax advisor
for almost one hundred of his students, aiding them in filing false
W-4 statements. 151
The defendant asserted that the First Amendment protected his
speech, relying on the fact that he had not incited imminent lawless
action.152 The trial court disagreed and refused to instruct the jury,
as the defendant requested, that the First Amendment provided a
defense for his conduct. 153 The Second Circuit affirmed this ruling
in holding that it has rarely been suggested that free speech extends to violations of a criminal statute. 154 Furthermore, the Second
Circuit elaborated that, even if the defendant's First Amendment
rights had been somehow abridged, the government's interest in
maintaining the IRS far outweighed the defendant's rights. 155
C.

United States v. Varani

In United States v. Varani,156 the defendant filed a blank income
tax return.157 He was contacted by a collection officer for the IRS,
Mr. Samuel Ginsburg, attempting to collect on Varani's delinquent
accounts. 15S In 1967, the defendant paid his 1965 taxes, however, after noticing that that the defendant also filed a blank income tax
return for 1966, Mr. Ginsburg contacted the defendant again and
asked him to refile and pay his 1966 income taxes. 159 Varani became
belligerent with the collections officer, refused to file the 1966 return, and threatened to shoot Mr. Ginsburg and any member of the
IRS if they attempted to seize his property.l60 Despite this threat, Mr.
Ginsburg again contacted the defendant and arranged a meeting to
discuss the situation. 161 Upon arriving, the defendant again
threatened Mr. Ginsburg, this time promising to blow his head
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See ill.
See id.
See ill.
See ill. at 1277-78.
See id. at 1278 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982) (citations omitted».
See Rnwiee, 899 F.2d at 1279 (citations omitted).
435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) (" [S]peech is not protected by the First
Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself.").
See id. at 758.
See id. at 759.
See id.
See id.
See ill.
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Off.162 Following this meeting, the defendant wrote a long, rambling,
and violent letter to Mr. Ginsburg in which he again stated that he
would shoot Mr. Ginsburg if anyone attempted to seize his property.163 As a result, the defendant was criminally charged with threatening an officer of the IRS, a violation of federal law. l64
At trial, the defendant claimed he could not be held criminally
liable for his threats because of his First Amendment right to free
speech. 165 The court analyzed this defense under United States v.
Schenck166 and the "clear and present danger test."167 The court held
that, despite the logic of the defendant's contention, speech was not
protected when it was the crime itself, and accordingly, the court
found the defendant guilty.l68
IV. THE RICE v. PALADIN ENTERPRISES, INC.
COASTER UNNECESSARILY LIMITS FREE SPEECH

ROLLER

Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. 169 resulted after the gruesome
murder of three victims in Silver Spring, Maryland by James Perry.170
Perry committed these murders by following instructi0ns provided
in books entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors ("Hit Man"), and How to Make a Silencer ("Silencers"), both
published by Paladin Enterprises ("Paladin").171 Family members of
the victims brought a wrongful death action against Paladin on the
theory that, by publishing books instructing how to murder for hire,
Paladin aided and abetted Perry.172 Paladin defended this action
based on its First Amendment right to publish the books. 173

162.
163.
164.
165.

166.
167.
168.

169.
170.
171.

172.
173.

See
See
See
See

Varani, 435 F.2d at 759.
id. at 760.

26 U.S.C. 7212(a) (1964).
Varani, 435 F.2d at 761.
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
See Varani, 435 F.2d at 761.
See id. at 762.
Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, Rice v. Paladin
Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
See Rice, 128 F.3d at 242; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838.
See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241 n.2; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. As their titles sugge~t,
these books chronicle how to carry out a murder for hire, and how to create
a tool to silence the noise that emanates from a bullet exiting a gun. See Rice,
940 F. Supp. at 838.
See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838.
See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838.
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A. Initial Analysis of Rice: the Brandenburg Application Results in
Publisher Protection
The Federal District Court of Maryland identified the five areas
of speech that receive limited or no First Amendment protection,t74
and determined that Hit Man could be categorized as speech inciting imminent, lawless activity under Brandenburg, affording limited
First Amendment protection. 175 First, the form of speech involved
advocating or instructing lawless activity.176 Second, the Brandenburg
standard applies to speech in all contexts, not just political
speech. 177
Under the Brandenburg test, to justify restricting speech "because it was an incitement to lawless action, the court must be satisfied that the speech (1) was directed or intended toward the goal of
producing imminent lawless conduct and (2) was likely to produce
such imminent conduct."178 In the present case, Paladin conceded
that their books were intended to produce criminal activity.179 However, to impose liability on Paladin, the speech must be unprotected
and the publisher must have intended imminent lawless activity to
result, necessitating Paladin to intend for Perry to murder the victims immediately upon reading the book. 180 This did not occur.181
The families of the victims argued that, even if Brandenburg
does apply, they should still prevail,182 arguing that "the three components of the Brandenburg test have been met: 1) intent, 2) imminence, and 3) likelihood."183 The court rejected this argument for
174. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841. See supra Part II (enumerating the areas of speech
afforded limited First Amendment protection).
175. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841, 84445. Brandenburg v. Ohio prohibits the government from forbidding "advocacy of the use of force or of law violation" unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." [d. at 841. See supra notes
97-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the free speech test enunciated in Brandenburg.
176. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841.
177. See id. The court analogized the facts sub judice to cases in which the Brandenburg doctrine was applied whereby physical injury or death resulted allegedly
from viewing violent movies and television shows. See id.
178. [d. at 846.
179. See id. at 847.
180. See id.
181. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847. The parties stipulated that Perry committed the
murders one year after receiving the books. See id.
182. See id.
183. [d.
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several reasons: first, the intent to which Paladin conceded is irrelevant to the analysis; second, as stated previously, there was no evidence that Paladin intended immediate, lawless activity; third, although repugnant, the book "does not constitute incitement or 'a
call to action.' "184
Elaborating, the court described the book as advocating, or
teaching in an abstract manner, rather than inciting. ISS It found that
the book did not cross the line between permissibly advocating violence and impermissibly inciting a crime. 186 The book did not purport to command anyone to any action immediately, nor did it tend
to incite violence. 187 Finally, the court found that the books did not
constitute incitement to imminent, lawless activity because the content in Hit Man and Silenccis was voluminous; the "deadly information . . . presumably take [s] time to read." 188
In its holding, the court stated that "First Amendment protection is not eliminated simply because the publication of an idea creates a potential hazard. "189 In a free society, it is unacceptable "to
limit and restrict creativity in order to avoid dissemination of ideas
in artistic speech which may adversely affect emotionally and troubled individuals. "190 Concluding that Paladin was permitted to raise
the First Amendment as a defense in this action, the court granted
its summary judgment motion. 191

B. The Fourth Circuit Reverses, Expanding States' Rights and Limiting
First Amendment Protection
The facts and issue considered on appeal by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit were identical to those considered by the district court: whether the "First Amendment absolutely bars the imposition of liability upon a publisher for assisting
184. [d. (quoting Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 480 F. Supp 199, 204

(S.D. Fla. 1979) (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,322 (1957»).
185. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 847-48. Over 13,000 copies of the book had been sold, and one per-

188.
189.
190.
191.

son actually used the information over the ten years that the book has been
printed. See id. at 848. In addition, the disclaimers in the advertisement and
on the book itself stating that the book was for informational purposes only
did not "indicate a tendency to incite violence." [d.
See id. at 848.
[d. (citing Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 824 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1987».
See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848.
See id. at 849.
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in the commISSIon of criminal acts." 192 As in the district court proceeding, the publisher, Paladin Enterprises, stipulated to facts that
establish civil liability as a matter of law for aiding and abetting
James Perry, the defendant convicted of the murders in the underlying criminal case, unless it is afforded First Amendment
protection. 193
However, after a much more conservative analysis, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the lower court, stating:
[L] ong-established case law provides that speech-even
speech by the press-that constitutes criminal aiding and
abetting does not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment, and . . . we hold . . . that the First Amendment does
not pose a bar to a finding that Paladin is civilly liable as an
aider and abetter of Perry's triple contract murder.194
In reaching this conclusion, the court first recognized the holding of Brandenburg v. Ohio: 195 "abstract advocacy of lawlessness is protected speech under the First Amendment,"196 and such a right is
"one of the ultimate safeguards of liberty."197
The court then countered Brandenburg's application to the case
sub judice by enumerating cases denying First Amendment protection to defendants criminally charged with aiding and abetting the
violation of a criminal statute as a result of their speech act;198 "it is
equally well established that speech which . . . is tantamount to legitimately proscribable, nonexpressive conduct may itself be legiti192. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997). All other issues of
law and fact were reserved for subsequent proceedings. See id. See supra notes
169-73 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the facts of Rice at
both the district and appellate court levels; see also supra notes 179-81, 184-88
and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and issue of Rice in the
district court proceeding.
193. See id. Paladin stipulated that: Perry followed the directions in the Hit Man
and Silencers books, both how-to manuals to commit crimes published by Paladin Enterprises; in marketing Hit Man, Paladin intended to attract and assist
criminals and aspiring criminals who desire information on how to commit
crimes; it intended and had knowledge that Hit Man would be used upon receipt by criminals to plan and execute murder for hire; and that, by publishing and selling Hit Man, it assisted Perry in the murders. See id.
194. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1997).
195. 395 U.S. 44 (1969).
196. Rice, 128 F.3d at 243.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 243-46.
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mately proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of generally acceptable statutes. "199 The court
elaborated: "it rarely has been suggested that the constitutional
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute. "200
As further support, the Fourth Circuit enumerated court opinions considering whether the speech-act doctrine should be applied
to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting the underlying criminal offense, stating that every court considering the issue held that
the First Amendment is not an absolute defense, per se, even when
the aiding and abetting is in the form of speech. 201
Further, the Fourth Circuit analogized the cases previously discussed, whereby no First Amendment protection was afforded to
criminal defendants charged with aiding and abetting a crime as a
result of a speech act, to the civil action before the court. 202 In doing so, it relied on a Congressional Report concerning the availability of bom1:rmaking information prepared by the Department of Justice, stating:
[T]he law is now well established that the First Amendment, and Brandenburg's "imminence" requirement in particular, generally poses litde obstacle to the punishment of
speech that constitutes criminal aiding and abetting, because "culpability in such cases is premised, not on defendants' 'advocacy' of criminal conduct, but on defendants'
199. [d. at 243 (quoting Cohen v. Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) ("noting 'wellestablished line of decisions holding that generally applicable law do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press
has incidental effects of its ability to gather and report the news'"».
200. [d. (quoting Gibony v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)
(additional citations omitted in original».
201. See id. at 24446. The court referred to the following cases: United States v.
Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 1990) (failing to recognize Brandenburg as a defense to a conviction for conspiring to transport and aid and abet
gambling equipment across state lines); United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d
549, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1985) (sustaining convictions for criminal liability for
counseling tax evasion); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982)
(disallowing First Amendment protection for publishing and distributing instructions on manufacturing illegal drugs charged with aiding and abetting
under a criminal statute). See id. at 24445. The court also enumerated several
cases holding the First Amendment inapplicable to criminal charges of aiding
and abetting violations of tax laws. See id. at 245-46.
202. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 1997).
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successful efforts to assist others by detailing to them the
means of accomplishing the crimes. "203
To make this connection, the court stated:
[W]hile there is considerably less authority on the subject,
we assume that those speech acts, which the government
may criminally prosecute with little or no concern for the
First Amendment, the government may likewise subject to
civil penalty or make subject to private causes of action.
Even if this is not universally so, we believe it must be true
at least where the government's interest in preventing the
particular conduct at issue is uncontrovertibly compelling. 204
The court qualified this newly enunciated rule in two ways.20S
First, when a publisher only could foresee the possible misuse of information for impermissible purposes, then the First Amendment
may "stand as a bar to the imposition of liability .... "206 This qualification would strike a balance between protecting the chilling effect of innocent, lawfully useful speech and holding accountable
those who would "intentionally assist and encourage crime and then
shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First
Amendment. "207
The second qualification is that the First Amendment might
limit a state's power to create and enforce a cause of action that
would permit imposing civil liability for speech constituting pure abstract advocacy not satisfying the Brandenburg test. 20S
The court stated that, because states are authorized to regulate
speech under a criminal statute, they are empowered to regulate
203. See id. (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF

204.

205.
206.
207.

208.

BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CON·
TROLLED BY FEDERAL LAw, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAy
BE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, April, 1997, at 37, available at <http:/ /
www.derechos.org/human-rights/speech/bomb.html#pubavail»; see also supra
notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Department of Justice Report).
Rice, 128 F.3d at 24647.
See id. at 247. Both qualifications were inapplicable to the case at bar. See id.
[d.
[d. at 24748.
[d. at 248-49. Speech that is "not 'directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action . . . [nor] likely to incite or produce such action' " does not
meet the Brandenburg test. [d. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,

447 (1969».
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speech under a civil claim for aiding and abetting a crime. 209 As a
result, the court held that the First Amendment did not bar the
plaintiffs' action and the facts of the case would support a finding
that Paladin was civilly liable for aiding and abetting James Perry in
the murders of Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders. 210

v.

HAD BRANDENBURG BEEN CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE
RICE COURTS, NO FURTHER LIMITATIONS OF PUBLISHER'S
FREEDOM OF SPEECH WAS NECESSARY

The federal district court correctly determined that Brandenlmrg
applied to Paladin Press's publication of the murder for hire instruction manual, Hit Man. 211 However, the district court incorrectly
applied the facts of Rice to Brandenlmrg,212 resulting in an erroneous
decision. Further complicating the case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the correct conclusion, but
improperly analyzed Rice v. Paladin Enterprises under the Brandenlmrg
test, and instead expanded States' ability to circumscribe speech. 213
Although the result was the same as it would have been had the district court correctly analyzed the facts of the case under Brandenlmrg,214 the Fourth Circuit was overreaching and unsettled over
thirty years of precedent.
A.

The Correct Rule Misapplied: The District Court's Approach

For over thirty years, the Brandenlmrg test has been applied to
determine whether free speech protected under the First Amendment should be limited because the nature of the speech is likely to
cause imminent, lawless activity.215 This test was applied by the Fed209. Rice, 128 F.3d at 250.

210. See id. at 243, 250, 265.
211. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal
district court's analysis of the correct law under which to analyze Rice v. Paladin Enterprises.
212. See supra notes 180-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal
district court's analysis of the facts of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises under the Brandenlmrg test.
213. See supra notes 204, 209 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale and holding of the Fourth Circuit's review of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises on
appeal.
214. Compare supra note 210 and accompanying text (stating the court of appeals
holding in Rice v. Paladin) with Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 250 (4th
Cir. 1997) (discussing the case within the context of the rule announced in
Brandenlmrg) .
215. See supra notes 97-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brandenlmrg
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eral District Court for the District of Maryland in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises when it determined whether the defendant, invoking First
Amendment protection for crimes resulting from its publication of
a murder for hire manual, should be granted summary judgment. 216
To determine whether the publisher should be afforded limited
First Amendment protection, the district court reviewed each of the
unprotected areas of speech217 and, after negating the others, determined that "the only category of unprotected speech which Hit
Man could conceivably be placed is incitement to imminent, lawless
activity under Brandenburg. "218 When explaining this determination,
the court stated that the Brandenburg standard was appropriate because it "involves speech which advocates or teaches lawless activity,
in this case murder, "219 and that the standard was not limited to political speech.220 The court then analogized the facts of the present
case to those in a series of "copy-cat" cases in which the Brandenburg
standard was applied because they, like Hit Man, "considered depictions of violence alleged to have been imitated. "221
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
216. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Md. 1996). The plaintiffs
brought wrongful death and survival actions against the defendant on the theory that, by publishing a book on how to . murder for hire, the defendant
aided and abetted the murderer in committing the crime. See id. See al~o
supra notes 169-73, 175 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises and supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the district court's application of the Brandenlntrg test.
217. For a discussion of the other areas of speech afforded limited or no protection see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (enumerating the types of
unprotected speech), notes 36-45 and accompanying text (obscenity), notes
46-51 and accompanying text (fighting words), notes 52-66 and accompanying
text (libel), notes 67-94 and accompanying text (commercial speech), and
notes 97-127 and accompanying text.
218. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841. See also supra 175-88 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how the district court applied Brandenlntrg to Rice v. Paladin Enters.
219. Id. at 845.
220. Id. at 846.
221. Id. at 846-47 (citing Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir.
1987) (reversing the jury's damage award against magazine publisher for
wrongful death of adolescent who died from alleged autoerotic asphyxia after
reading article describing the same); Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.
Fla. 1979) (alleging commission of criminal acts as a result of violent programming); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1988) (suing record
company for Ozzy Ozboume record that included song "Suicide Solution");
Olivia N. v. NBC, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (raping of girl with bottle by
teenaged girls imitating similar incident depicted on television drama, Born
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Once determining the legal standard under which to review the
case, the court then examined the facts of the case and determined
that Hit Man did not constitute incitement to imminent lawless action, and therefore the publication did not fit into a category of
speech with limited protection under the First Amendment. 222 The
court reached this determination because, in order to show speech
was an incitement to lawless action, the speech must be "directed or
intended toward the goal of producing imminent lawless conduct
and ... was likely to produce such imminent conduct. "223 The court
held that although the defendant conceded to intending for its
books to be "purchased and actually used by criminals, [it has] not
conceded to the requisite intent, "224 imminent lawless action. 225
The district court interprets imminent, lawless action as immediate. 226 However, the interpretation of "immediate" should depend
on the facts of the case. Paladin intended to for its book to be used
by criminals to carry out murders for hire. 227 However, given the extent of the speech and the intricacies of the crime encouraged, the
definition of immediate must be expanded to contemplate the criminal's reading of the book, and preparation of the crime. "Nothing
in this book says, 'go out and commit murder now!' "228 However,
that is not required under Brandenburg; the detailed instructions
provided in Hit Man teach the preparation of the concrete action
of the highest form of violence prohibited under Brandenburg. 229

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Innocent); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass.
1989) (gang-killing of boy after perpetrators viewed the film The Warriors,
which depicted scenes of gang violence); DeFilippo v. NBC, 446 A.2d 1036,
1040 (R.I. 1982) (imitating a hanging stunt seen on Johnny Carson, a minor
child killed himself resulting in parents wrongful death action against NBC).
"Copy cat" cases are those in which a violent act resulted from the perpetrator viewing or otherwise perceiving the act through a form of publication
(such as a movie, song, book, or the like). See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 846.
See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847-48.
[d. at 846 (citing McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (1988) (citing
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973»).
[d. at 847.
[d.
See id.
See id.
See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (1997) (citing Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 233, 235 (1961); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448
(1969) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961»; Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298,320 (1957».
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The Fourth Circuit Reaches the Correct Result, But Without the Rule

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reached the appropriate result, holding that a trier of fact could
find the requisite intent under Brandenburg to limit Paladin's First
Amendment right to free speech. 230 However, it did not reach this
conclusion under an analysis of the test created in Brandenburg. 231
The Brandenburg test was carefully created by the Supreme
Court to ensure that its limitation on speech was narrowly crafted. 232
By failing to use this test, the Fourth Circuit created another exception to free speech, and enlarged states' authority to regulate
speech using civil remedies so long as the speech is associated with
a criminal act that the state may prosecute. 233 This was unnecessary
because the same conclusion could have been reached under the
appropriate Brandenburg test. 234
Given the sanctity associated with free speech and the First
Amendment in the United States,235 the Fourth Circuit's analysis was
inappropriate. The probable outcome is increased liability, which
would, effectively, result in prior restraint on publishers afraid to
print material because of the likelihood of defending a civil suit. 236
VI.

CONCLUSION
Freedom of speech has been paramount to our country's iden-

230. See generaUy Rice, 128 F.3d at 249 (stating the court's holding); supra notes 204,
209 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale and holding of
the Fourth Circuit's review of Rice v. Paladin Enters. on appeal.
231. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 249.
232. See supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
233. Rice, 128 F.3d at 24647.
234. See supra Part V.A for a discussion of why the Brandenburg test was appropriate
under the facts of Rice v. Paldin Enterprises and how the outcome under Brandenburg would afford Paladin limited First Amendment protection.
235. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the high regard for freedom of speech in American society.
236. See Near v. State of Minnesota ex TeL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931) (explaining that a primary purpose of free press is to prevent previous restraints upon
publication); Chaplin sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.3 (1942) (noting that free press extends beyond freedom from prior restraint). Prior restraints "are the most serious and least tolerable infringements on First
Amendment rights." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
Additionally, "[i]f it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time."
Id. (citing A. Bickel, THE MoRALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
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tity and formation. 237 Since the ratification of the First Amendment
in the Bill of Rights, only a handful of limitations have been imposed on the right to free speech and free press. 238 However, this
tradition was undercut by the Fourth Circuit in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises. 239 In Rice, the Fourth Circuit failed to apply the appropriate
Brandenburg test, despite the likelihood that the outcome would
have been identicaJ.240 By creating a new standard of review,241 the
court encroached upon a tradition to which writers, publishers and
Americans are and have been entitled to for the past thirty years. 242
The potential liability imposed on Paladin Enterprises for printing
its murder for hire manuaP43 likely and inappropriately sends a
wave of concern among publishers nationwide about potential liability resulting from the words they print.
Elise M. Balkin

137. See supra notes 15, 26-29 and accompanying text discussing the importance of
the free exchange of ideas on American history.
238. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text enumerating the limitations on
the right to free speech.
139. See supra Part N for a discussion of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises.
240. See supra Part N.B for an analysis of the district and appellate court holdings
in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises.
241. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text for the standard of review created by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises.
.
242. See supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
243. See supra Part N for a discussion of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises.
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